Blame is traditionally studied within ethics as part of the topic of individual moral responsibility for action. However, as is increasingly recognised, there are important connections between moral responsibility and epistemology. For instance, one can be blameworthy not only for one’s actions but also for certain beliefs (e.g. prejudices and dogmatic beliefs against the evidence). Prejudice can lead to a specifically epistemic form of injustice as when the word of women or members of certain minorities are given less credibility than they deserve. Last, groups as well as individuals are often treated as morally responsible and blameworthy. But, making sense of group moral responsibility requires answering questions in social epistemology about what it is for a group to have beliefs or knowledge.
The project will exploit the strength of Scottish philosophy, bringing together researchers from the philosophy departments at Edinburgh, Glasgow and St Andrews with expertise in epistemology and moral philosophy. We will explore blame across three workshops and a public event.