Workshop 3: Epistemic injustice and blame

Glasgow. Autumn 2019.

This workshop aims to investigate a kind of epistemic injustice that has recently become the focus of philosophical attention: giving a speaker less credibility than she deserves because of prejudice against the group of which she is a member, say being a woman or from a certain ethnic minority. Such behaviour not only deprives the community of the knowledge of some of its members but can also undermine those affected in their capacity as enquirers, say by undermining confidence. Our workshop seeks to examine the extent to which we can be blamed for such epistemic injustice. This question is complicated by the fact that 1) one might not be aware of one’s prejudices; 2) one’s prejudices may be widely shared in one’s community; and 3) epistemic injustice is often a consequence of institutional and societal practices. But to the extent that one’s not aware of one’s prejudices and/or they are part of broader institutional and societal practices it is less clear that one can be blamed for them.